Symposium on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Beyond: Advancing Canadian Trade and Investment in Asia by Mank, Randolph
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 7 • Issue 5 
August 2015
SPP Communiqués are brief 
articles that deal with a singular 
public policy issue and are 
intended to provide the reader 
with a focused, concise critical 
analysis of a specific policy issue.
Copyright © 2015 by The School 
of Public Policy.
All rights reserved. No part of this 
publication may be reproduced in 
any manner whatsoever without 
written permission except in the 
case of brief passages quoted in 
critical articles and reviews.
The University of Calgary is 
home to scholars in 16 faculties 
(offering more than 80 academic 
programs) and 36 Research 
Institutes and Centres including 
The School of Public Policy. 
Under the direction of Jack 
Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public 
Policy, and supported by 
more than 100 academics and 
researchers, the work of The 
School of Public Policy and its 
students contributes to a more 
meaningful and informed public 
debate on fiscal, social, energy, 
environmental and international 
issues to improve Canada’s and 
Alberta’s economic and social 
performance.
SYMPOSIUM ON THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP AND BEYOND: 
ADVANCING CANADIAN TRADE  
AND INVESTMENT IN ASIA, 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY  
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
Notes for the keynote address by Randolph Mank
Canadian War Museum, 
Ottawa, June 18, 2015
EDITOR’S NOTE
On June 18, 2015 the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy hosted the 
symposium The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Beyond: Advancing Canadian 
Trade and Investment in Asia, at the Canadian War Museum. The School was 
honoured to have Dr. Randolph Mank present the keynote address at this event 
who brings over thirty years of public and private sector experience in Asia to 
his analysis of Canadian relations in Asia. A three-time Canadian Ambassador 
in the Asian region, having served in Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, Mank 
also held the position of Senior Advisor and Vice President Asia for Blackberry 
and currently lives in Singapore.
Presenting a policy prescription for Canadian-Asian relations over the next five 
years or so, Mank shares a personal “Top 10” list of specific things Canada should 
do to advance national and business interests in Asia. Although expanding trade 
linkages in the region is obviously crucial for Canada, Mank’s recommendations 
are positioned within the broader framework of strengthening our diplomatic 
platform and development assistance in the region. Mank concludes that if 
Canada does not increase its engagement and investment in Asia, we won’t 
be an influential player in the evolving and highly integrated new world order. 
One might agree with every recommendation, or once might quibble with the 
government-centered focus of his prescriptions; most certainly, some Canadian 
firms have been successful in Asia and we could learn from their experiences. 
That said, Dr. Mank speaks from authority and we are pleased to publish his 
speech as a valuable contribution to a more informed and public debate on 
Canada’s future role in Asia.
1I want to thank the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy for inviting me here today. And 
thank you all for coming as well. Living in Asia, I’m always delighted to come back home and see old 
friends and colleagues, and to be reminded how Asia-Pacific issues are viewed through the Canadian 
lens. 
A few years ago, I found myself in a large plenary room facing no less than 21 APEC senior officials 
at their secretariat in Singapore. By some twist of fate, I had been shortlisted as a candidate for the 
role of executive director of the APEC Secretariat. Wisely, they selected someone eminently more 
qualified for the job in the end.
But looking at all those faces in the room, it reminded me that, in APEC, consensus is required 
on absolutely everything, and it is a long and arduous thing to achieve when so many officials and 
countries are involved.
It must have looked this way, too, to the leaders of New Zealand, Singapore and Chile when they 
decided at the APEC summit in Los Cabos, Mexico in 2002 to create their own little free-trade 
initiative for Asia, in a sub-group that was joined by Brunei in 2005. 
And that was how the TPP really started. I’m not going to go through a long history of the twists and 
turns that led us to that point and to here. But I think we should note that a highly productive process 
towards convergence began right there. And convergence will be my key word today. 
It’s somewhat ironic, given what’s happening currently in Congress over the issue of fast-track 
authority, but we all know that U.S. inclusion in 2008 finally put wind in the TPP sails. We also know 
that some of us in the field were tasked with the diplomacy of getting Canada in the door in 2012, that 
Japan’s decision to join in 2013 was a major breakthrough, and that we now have 12 countries well-
advanced in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership. We also have a general idea of the areas 
being negotiated, including some of the sticky bits. 
So I would like to turn to the two main questions suggested by the title of this symposium:
WHAT LIES BEYOND THE TPP?
How can we advance Canadian trade and investment in Asia? On this, I will share my personal 
Top 10 list of things we should do.
Three quick disclaimers: 
First, I am not a trade policy specialist and I have no inside knowledge of the current TPP 
negotiations. 
Second, I am a free-trade supporter. I believe that the benefits of free trade generally outweigh its 
downsides, though I acknowledge that there are some very serious opponents who make the case that 
globalization has resulted in a loss of jobs in some sectors, and increased economic inequality. These 
effects certainly need to be mitigated.
Third, I’m a foreign policy realist. Canada’s vital foreign policy interest lies in getting right its 
relations with the United States, including such mundane things as border management and an array 
of everyday, bread and butter issues. The horrific events of 9/11 showed that this relationship is of 
existential importance to us and vastly outweighs everything else we do internationally. Geography is 
truly destiny and our trade figures underscore our economic reality. 
Let’s be honest, that’s why Asia has lacked our full and consistent attention, even though many of us 
strongly believe in diversification and don’t see it as a zero-sum game.
2If the U.S. is our No. 1 foreign policy priority, certainly a second priority has always been a rules-
based global system — for trade and investment, security and human rights. We can’t project power 
and impose our will. So our interests lie in global rules and order. And this, along with impressive 
regional growth rates, is why the TPP and Asia must be an important area of focus.
To continue the rule of threes, I view the TPP as crucial to Canada for the following main reasons:
First, we would be severely harmed if we were on the outside of any new set of trade rules that 
involved such a large set of markets, including our key NAFTA partners — the U.S. and Mexico — 
as well as such an important country as Japan.
Second, in addition to the specific agreed liberalization measures — which can boost trade through 
reduced tariffs and barriers — the habit of dialogue itself opens up new and beneficial bilateral 
channels for problem-solving and dispute resolution.
Third, the TPP will push us to take much needed measures to improve our own economic policy and 
infrastructure at home. For Canada, a country whose products are generally not close to ports, if we 
are to come out ahead, it will be crucial to strengthen our transportation policy and infrastructure — 
road, rail, pipelines — to get product to ports and out to distant markets. But we are up against vast 
distances, a harsh winter, a complex regulatory environment, and limited investment capital. 
So yes, the TPP is important to us. But it is equally important to look beyond it. And I have one main 
message regarding the beyond:
It’s that word convergence again. This applies whether we actually succeed in concluding the TPP 
or not. The process of bringing economies together must continue, not stop. There are, in fact, other 
processes underway, which will change not only the region but potentially the global economy as 
well. The opposite outcome, divergence, and then, inevitably, a companion strategy of containment, 
would be the wrong way to go. That’s not the “new world order” that we want or need.
Since the TPP is missing three of the big players in Asia — China, India and Indonesia (even 
assuming South Korea and others will enter) — ideally we need to bring them on board. The WTO 
is supposed to harmonize trade arrangements globally and ideally it would get back on track. At 
the same time, if it doesn’t work out this way, we need to take seriously the various other regional 
processes and initiatives in play. In my view, we should already be conducting focused diplomacy, 
advocating a convergence of these processes towards the APEC vision of a true Free Trade Area of 
the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). If not, we will be left with what we have now: a fragmentation of trade 
arrangements. 
One of those other initiatives is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
initiative, launched by ASEAN in 2012, which includes all of the big Asian players. RCEP includes 
more than three billion people, has a combined GDP of about $17 trillion, and accounts for about 40 
per cent of world trade.
We have a bad habit of not taking these new processes seriously when they begin, and then 
scrambling to get on board later when they gather momentum and we realize that our interests are 
involved. The TPP was an example of this. Canada doesn’t have an FTA with ASEAN, so we aren’t 
a party to the RCEP process in the first instance. Canada is also the only ASEAN Dialogue partner 
left out of the East Asia Summit process, which should be both a warning sign and a focus for serious 
diplomacy to rectify. 
On another front, we need to keep an eye on the progress, or lack thereof, towards the launching of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) targeted for the end of this year. This is meant to integrate 
the flow of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labour among ASEAN countries. By 2020, 
ASEAN banking institutions are supposed to be integrated as well, all of which is highly ambitious 
and of course surrounded with much doubt.
3Perhaps more fundamental than all of these processes is what China is doing under the leadership of 
Xi Jinping in its “belt and road” vision for Eurasian trade development. This is profound. China is 
sitting on almost $4 trillion in foreign-currency reserves and it naturally wants to invest these beyond 
U.S. Treasury bills. While building a vast network of trade infrastructure connecting Asia to Europe, 
Russia, the Middle East and Africa, they will also export renminbi savings and thus continue to 
create an offshore renminbi market and assert their financial power. That’s a potential game changer.
Don’t underestimate this. Asian countries would need about US$750 billion a year through to 2020 
to finance all of their infrastructure needs. The World Bank and ADB invest $20 billion a year in 
infrastructure worldwide. China’s new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is still being 
capitalized, but will be much larger. Its companion, the Silk Road Fund, will start with $40 billion. 
This is in addition to China’s New Development Bank with the BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. And, already since 1994, China has had three other financial institutions 
involved in capital exports: the China Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank, and the 
Agricultural Development Bank. Plus they have a sovereign wealth fund, the Chinese Investment 
Corp., modelled on Temasek of Singapore, and they also have the state-owned China International 
and Trust Investment Corp. 
China’s full-court press is on. In some respects, the pivot started in Beijing, not Washington.
So, if that’s the context, let me turn now to how we can advance Canadian trade and investment in 
and from Asia.
I was invited to speak today because I work in Asia and have a background in both government and 
business. In preparation for my remarks, I conducted a highly unscientific survey of Chamber of 
Commerce members and business friends in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in recent weeks to 
see what they thought about the TPP. Their responses ranged from “what does TPP stand for?” to the 
general, “we support free trade,” to “we will let you know when we find out what’s in the agreement.”
Those are actually fair responses. Businesspeople want concrete and practical support from their 
governments. And too many analysts fail to say what we should actually do. So allow me to put my 
policy-maker hat back on and share with you my own 2020 vision; as promised, the Top 10 very 
specific things that I think we should do over the coming five years. Some of these ideas are inspired 
by inputs that I have received from the business community in Asia over the years.
1. EXPAND TRADE LINKAGES
I’ve already mentioned my No. 1 suggestion: we need to conclude the TPP, and then start expanding 
our trade relationships even further, ideally by broadening TPP membership, or via a convergence 
with the RCEP or any other initiative that gains traction. If it turns out that the TPP doesn’t move 
forward and we need to go through the more classical route of negotiating a Canada-ASEAN FTA, 
then we should get on with it.
One new strategic bridge into Asia would be to join the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) that I mentioned before. I know this is controversial, especially in the U.S., but several 
of our European partners are already in: the U.K., France, Germany and Italy. Hanging back 
will disadvantage us when it comes to participating in infrastructure projects and also signal our 
continuing ambivalence about Asia. Deftly handled, joining could be used as a key to open some 
hitherto closed doors, while working inside to ensure that best practices are followed. It would also 
demonstrate our intention to get involved and stay involved
42. STRENGTHEN TRADE-SUPPORT SERVICES IN ASIA
The Canadian government’s Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP) notes that trade accounts for 60 
per cent of our GDP and one in five Canadian jobs. Yet, it’s all in the hands of just a few hundred 
superb trade commissioners in the field, with resources constantly under pressure. Trade agreements 
can open doors, but Canadian businesses have to find the deals. I can tell you, it isn’t easy. Asia is 
very complicated and our businesses need local knowledge and support. The Trade Commissioner 
Service should be grown significantly — doubled, I would say — in both personnel and program 
resources. Provinces should also be encouraged to deploy more commercial representatives and co-
locate in our embassies. Trade services should also be expanded to recognize that supply lines are 
multinational and that support is sometimes required for non-Canadian companies involved in deals 
that benefit Canada. Two key Crown corporations — Export Development Canada and the Canadian 
Commercial Corp. — need to be much better resourced to increase their presence in the region. They 
also need to become more dynamic, visible and aggressive in pursuit and support of deals.
3. IMPROVE VISA SERVICES
It sounds mundane after talking about FTAs, but I can’t over-emphasize how crucial this is. After 
personally working with Petronas for over a year to convince them to invest in Canada, and priming 
them for their largest outward investment ever at $36 billion, the deal was jeopardized by the decision 
to close our visa office in Kuala Lumpur, just at the height of negotiations when executives were 
shuttling back and forth to Calgary, Vancouver and Ottawa every week. The Petronas CEO was not 
pleased to learn that he had to go to Singapore to get his visa, especially since I had been pitching 
Canada so strenuously as an open and welcoming investment destination. Canada should have 
accredited visa officers in each major ASEAN partner country. Service-delivery targets should be 
two days for routine business and tourist visitors, and four weeks for students. It makes little sense to 
centralize the function in Singapore, where costs are among the highest in the world and the locals 
don’t actually need visas to visit us. Canada should also complete the pilot program and get on with 
full adoption of the APEC Business Travel Card, including eventual visa waivers for cardholders.
4. EMPOWER OUR NEW AMBASSADOR TO ASEAN
The new ambassador position is already announced, but should not just be a symbolic add-on 
in Jakarta. She or he should have sufficient staff and resources to help manage the broad range 
of ASEAN files. She or he should also be accredited as Canada’s senior official for ASEAN and 
should either be tasked with actively advocating the case for trade policy convergence, or should 
work closely with a credible special envoy so designated and tasked. We need profile, not another 
ambassador sent abroad with an invisibility cloak.
5. EXPAND OUR DEVELOPMENT-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Along with the current development-program focus on poverty, Canada should fund work by the 
ASEAN Secretariat in such critical areas as energy, climate change, fisheries management, and 
food security. This would play to Canada’s strengths, establish a credible niche for us, and provide 
the resident Canadian ambassador to ASEAN with a clear focus, a set of priorities, and significant 
resources to register our commitment and gain profile.
56. BOOST OUR S&T (SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY) DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION
It can’t only be about bulk commodity exports. Yet, we have only a very few S&T agreements 
with Asian countries: India and China (funded); Japan (unfunded); and South Korea (under 
negotiation). It’s in the areas of technology and innovation, across all sectors — not just IT itself, 
but also agriculture, energy, infrastructure and so on — where an advanced country like Canada, 
with expensive labour and other costs, needs to find competitive advantages as well as partners for 
investment. We can do more. I would like to see universities playing a much more active role as 
well in linking up with their partners in Asia. The University of Calgary School of Public Policy, for 
example, would make a great leader in this area.
7. ENCOURAGE DIRECT AIR LINKS
Though this is clearly a delicate private-sector-driven decision, bilateral air agreements should be 
reviewed in order to make conditions as favourable as possible to both Canadian and Asian carriers. 
The revised agreement with the Philippines is a good start. Hopefully the new Dreamliners will 
enable Air Canada will find profitable new routes to, and beyond, China and Japan. Improved visa 
services and strengthened education marketing would also encourage more travel and increase 
passenger loads.
8.  INCREASE FOCUS ON ASEAN BY THE ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION OF  
 CANADA (APFC)
The APFC should increase its work specifically on ASEAN, forming a closer link to the ASEAN 
Secretariat via the new resident Canadian ambassador to ASEAN. The APFC’s endowment should be 
increased to build specific capacity for ASEAN work, again in such areas as energy, climate change, 
fisheries management, and food security. 
9. STRENGTHEN THE CANADA-ASEAN BUSINESS COUNCIL (CABC)
Still a new organization, the CABC in Singapore should federate with the existing Canadian 
chambers in ASEAN (if not all of Asia), and work to increase membership to help strengthen the 
Canadian business presence and voice in the region. The CABC should hold annual forums in 
alternating ASEAN locations in the future, rather than the current biennial pace, which began 
in Singapore in 2013 and recurred in Bangkok this year. The CABC forum should also include 
opportunities for showcasing Canadian products and services and increasing Canada’s profile via the 
media and social networking. Somehow we have to get Canadian companies themselves to look to 
Asia in far greater numbers. There are, in fact, relatively few Canadian companies in the region. 
10. REVERSE THE EROSION OF OUR PLATFORM IN THE REGION
Last but not least, the downsizing or closures of embassies, visa offices and official residences should 
be reversed in Asia to avoid further erosion of our profile and competitive advantage. These assets 
are the key platforms for promoting Canadian political, commercial, cultural and developmental 
interests. Closures and downsizing make us look like a country in retreat.
6.....
I think if we put together a plan to do these things, ideally in public-private-sector partnership where 
possible, we would be in a much better position in the region by 2020. Call it “TPP plus.” I know that, 
with an election in the offing, even the TPP is going to be tough to manage, let alone a prescriptive 
list like mine. But forget about the election. Think about the throne speech afterwards. In my 
experience, that’s where the opportunity for fresh initiatives arises. 
If we are serious about Asia, we will invest. If not, we won’t. If we don’t dramatically increase our 
engagement, be prepared for geography to remain our destiny, and for others to continue to eat our 
lunch in Asia.
There are many other things that I haven’t covered in these already overly long remarks. There are 
practical barriers to trade, notably endemic corruption that will neither be wished nor negotiated 
away by the TPP. Asia doesn’t fare well on the Transparency International ratings. Examples of 
corruption are sadly commonplace in daily business dealings. My own experience as a businessman 
trying to sell products and services in Asian markets, and as an ambassador coaching innumerable 
Canadian companies across virtually every sector, is that this is a very real problem. We can’t and 
shouldn’t compete on this basis. So we sometimes simply lose the deals. 
I am also mindful, of course, of the geopolitical imperatives driving the TPP: the peace and conflict 
issues, which have been the focus of another part of my career. I will just say this: the disputes in the 
South China Sea not only have the potential to disrupt shipping routes and peaceful relations in Asia, 
but also could have implications for Law-of-the-Sea disputes and jurisprudence in our own northern 
waters. So we had better beware. 
But all of this would require another symposium, or perhaps a whole series. Suffice it to say that, 
alongside the wonderful trade and investment opportunities, there are also serious challenges in Asia 
around democracy, human rights, migrant smuggling, territorial and littoral disputes, cyber security, 
narcotics, and so on — any and all of which Canada has a deep stake in, as history so clearly shows. 
But let’s leave all that for another day. Today, we should be thinking of the opportunities that will 
come from the TPP, if indeed we get it concluded, and the need for convergence beyond, even if we 
don’t.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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